



FORWARD-LEANING Global Security Report



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PROPRIETARY CLASSIFICATION: BUSINESS-IN-CONFIDENCE

SNAP! SECURITY. TODAY. IN 60 SECONDS.

When they aren't praising rebels (and naming each and every fighter a *Mujahid*), *Jihadis* are applauding the growing strength of the *Salafi resurgence in Jordan and Egypt* where "masses of people willing to martyr themselves" ... What if the U.N. organized a consultative meeting on the future of Somalia, and no Somali officials came to consult? The meeting began yesterday in Nairobi, and, reckoning that the coffee would be laced with arsenic, the TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT stayed home (the current government's mandate expires in August and likely won't be renewed) ... The "Fight-Like-A-Dog" French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé ripped into NATO's campaign as *insuffisante*,¹ especially in Misurata, the western city where the rebels have a disputed presence and are **holding out** after 5 weeks of bombardment ... Now flying the lion's share of ground attack missions over Libya, France and the U.K. are asking the U.S. to "intensify" her role.



A Rafale M strike fighter from the French carrier CHARLES DE GAULE (R 91). (French MOD photo released today.)

¹ The French assessed that the White House was submerged "*sur une position un peu d'attente, d'attente*" – "in a wait-and-see position." With just 3 weeks as foreign minister, it was Alain Juppé who held reveille on the White House and bull-dogged U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1973 to passage. See: "Yesterday's Diplomatic Dance Triggers Dramatic White House Policy Reversal Today." **FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER** 11-041 17 March 2011. "French Foreign Minister: From 'Fighting Like a Dog' to 'We are Ready.'" **FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER** 11-042 18 March 2011.

REGIME VERSUS REVOLUTIONARIES: STALLED IN STALEMATE²

In early March, we assessed that Libya was locked in a political and military stalemate. That appraisal continues to hold fast.³ Politically, Qaddafi won't budge, and the rebels reject any deal that involves him or any member of his family staying on. In the east, revolutionary forces are outmaneuvered, outgunned and outflanked, and in the west, NATO is being outsmarted.

A leading NATO priority this week has been interdiction strikes in Misurata, attacks on which have been Qaddafi's priority for about 40 days. Interdicting regime forces there has become quite a chore, as **Qaddafi has dispersed his armor, hidden his tanks and ringed them with civilians.** Throughout the country, loyalists no longer travel in convoys identifiable as regime military, but in light trucks that look just like the vehicles used by rebels.

Assessment: One unintended consequence of the No-Fly Zone is that it has virtually sealed the stalemate in concrete. Air strikes have prompted Qaddafi forces to hold back tanks and heavy weaponry, so they are not skewered by precision munitions. In their place at the front: lighter weaponry but also infantry schooled in maneuver warfare. Advantage: Regime. The rebels, of course, lack both the hardware and tactical prowess to punch through the line. The result: **Libya is stalled in stalemate and will likely remain so until a dramatic change in strategy is applied by NATO.**



"Mad Max"⁴ Rocketry. Painted in the colors of the old Libyan flag (it was Qaddafi who changed it to all-green), rebels near Ajdabiya tend a hunk of aircraft, specifically a **UB-32 rocket pod housing 55mm SA-5 rockets.** The pod came from a downed Libyan Air Force **Sukhoi Su-24 aircraft.** Good luck aiming that pod, boys. **SA-5s** are shoot-and-hope unguided rockets. The un-marked photo was found in the coverage of the Libyan conflict on AS-ANSAR, an Arab-language *Jihadi* site.

The dramatic change will not be forthcoming with the U.S. and several European countries holding back and systemic command & control problems in NATO that stem from political limits set by the U.N. that all but prevent aircraft from responding in any meaningful way to calls of "TIC TIC TIC!"

² Excerpted from *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-050 8 April 2011.

³ "The Sword that Will Not Bend' Pledges to Fight Until the End." *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-038 2 March 2011.

⁴ **Hat Tip to David Cenciotti.** Thanks for the metaphor, shipmate.

"TIC TIC TIC!" AND THE NO-FLY CHALLENGE⁵

It was our judgment that the air mission over Libya was taking the form of Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), a form of air combat long abandoned by the doctrine writers of the Pentagon's E-Ring. The key difference between Close Air Support (CAS) and BAI is that CAS inserts a forward air controller (FAC) to clear pilots to drop bombs, launch air-to-ground missiles or fire guns in close proximity to friendly forces and civilians.⁶ (Yes, FACs are precisely what the revolutionaries require, but FACs mean boots on the ground – precisely what the opposition does not want and the U.N. excludes. That makes us wonder: is it NATO, the U.N. or the Libyan TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL that is channeling Joseph Heller's Yossarian? Or is it all three?)⁷



On Sunday, AL JAZEERA aired the first known footage showing Qaddafi forces in action. Shot in mid-March before coalition/NATO involvement, the video shows regime forces using **Grad Multiple Launch Rocket Systems** (MLRS and the **BM-21** launch vehicle, probably the Russian **9P138 "Grad I"** 36-tube launcher. On the right are two 122mm **Grad** missiles fired in rapid succession. Later in the video (about 01:40), a full-tilt, 40-round **BM-21** launch truck appears. **In our view, just the deployment against civilians of a Grad MLRS system would constitute an act of terrorism. We assessed also that "unleashing rapid-fire rockets on civilians" would or should "trigger ... a humanitarian intervention" and "preemptive strikes."**⁸ **LOOK FURTHER.**

Rebels have pleaded with NATO to strike enemy fighters with whom rebels are directly engaged. In a bizarre, convulsive press conference last week, former Libyan Interior Minister MGEN Abdul Fatah Younis began by flatly stating "NATO has let us down" by rejecting mission requests:

When a huge force of tanks, Grad missiles, rocket launchers and 155mm cannons appears and heads to Ajdabiya, Brega or Benghazi, we inform NATO instantly, because we do not have the type of weaponry to block them. NATO's response is very slow....

Is this Gaddafi force that is pushing forward going to wait for 8 hours until it is bombed from the air? Of course not! It will have entered the city and set it alight!

NATO has responded that, technically, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1973 does not charge the alliance with providing rebels Close Air Support. That said, interdiction of Qaddafi forces while they are pummeling rebels who are, technically, civilians, can be said to fall under the category of one of many "necessary measures to protect civilians," the operative phrase from the second sentence in UNSCR 1973. While we are speaking technically, the same sentence in that resolution forbids "a foreign occupation force of any form," and that language is the "Catch 22" that prevents insertion of the Forward Air Controllers that would enable NATO to fulfill opposition requests to support the rebels or, if you prefer, "protect civilians."

⁵ Excerpted from "Nagging No-Fly Problems," *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-050 8 April 2011, and other issues.

⁶ "Are There Boots (Non-Libyan Forward Air Controllers) on Libyan Soil?" *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-048 24 March 2011.

⁷ "Command of the Operation" – a Cluster by Any Other Name." *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-050 8 April 2011.

⁸ **"Flash:** Qaddafi Moves MLRS Launchers into Position; Their Very Deployment is Terrorism." *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-037 1 March 2011.

The rebel request that NATO engage Qaddafi forces while rebels forces are engaged is a situation described by the military term “Troops in Contact” or TIC (meaning, friendly troops in contact with enemy forces). TIC is an alarm bell in Close Air Support. In Afghanistan, for example, several attack helos are pre-staged ready to fly and fight in minutes should the call come in. And it usually comes in a hurry, with a radio operator transmitting “TIC, TIC, TIC!” when Marines are in a firefight and require Close Air Support. The TIC helos are in a readiness state analogous to “Ready Five” – the high-alert status on an aircraft carrier whereby fighter aircraft (Navy or Marine) are hooked to a catapult and ready to launch and intercept incoming hostiles within 5 minutes. It’s “quick draw,” but deadly serious quick draw.



Tunnel Vision. When policymakers unfamiliar with Air Warfare impose a No-Fly Zone but don’t put Forward Air Controllers on the ground, they are essentially asking pilots to see what pilots cannot possibly see. U.S. Marine and Royal Air Force AV-8B Harrier pilots strike ground targets at relatively high speed and extremely low altitude. Says one British Harrier jockey (*emphasis added*): “The problem of flying at 600 knots at 100 feet⁹ is that it feels as if you are flying through a tunnel. There is a segment of about 15 degrees either side of the nose of the aircraft where you can see clearly.... [Beyond that], the ground is just a blur. Because you are looking through that tunnel and you are so close to the ground, you dare not look anywhere else but where you are going.” Above, an RAF airman stood at the end of a field in Afghanistan, promising he wouldn’t flinch when an RAF Harrier screamed overhead at less than 100 feet and more than 600 knots. He flinched.

The Take-Away: Striking enemy convoys, tanks and artillery especially with friendly Troops in Contact (TIC) calls for Close Air Support (CAS). CAS requires Forward Air Controllers a.k.a. boots on the ground. There are none, at least not enough, in Libya. “Tunnel vision” on the part of pilots is the reason 75% of all strike aircraft over Libya on 5 April returned to their bases without dropping any ordnance and why strike aircraft mistakenly bombed rebels near Brega. Policymakers who expect pilots to see targets at 600 knots and 100 feet suffer from another kind of “tunnel vision” – a disorder that is more deadly than the aviator variant.

The Take-Away: Fulfilling rebel requests for Close Air Support without Forward Air Controllers is a recipe for disaster. Eliminate “lucky breaks,” and you are left with only two plausible outcomes. Both played out last week and will continue to manifest themselves in the weeks ahead:

- **First, lack of forward air control prevents the alliance from fulfilling its primary mission (“protect civilians”).** When a force hears “DANGER CLOSE” (friendlies in proximity), friendly casualties are *averted*. This is why fully three-fourths of all strike aircraft on missions on 5 April, for example, returned to their ships or their bases in Italy, Cyprus and Crete without dropping a single bomb or launching a ground attack missile.


⁹ When the RAF flew interdiction in the 1982 Falklands War, anytime they were close to Port Stanley (capital city and major air and sea port), they were 100-feet off the deck. The Harriers earned the nickname “Mud Movers.”

• **Second, when NATO fails to heed “DANGER CLOSE” *without* controllers, the “civilians” the alliance aims to “protect” end up killed.** Those familiar with the challenges and vagaries of tactical air control were not at all surprised by the words of RADM Russell Harding, R.N., deputy operation commander, when he explained why air strikes inadvertently struck and killed rebels in Brega:

The situation in the area is still very fluid, with tanks and other vehicles moving in different directions, making it very difficult to distinguish who may be operating them.



At Fault: Not Just Control, but Communications & Common Sense: Amateur video captured PAVEWAY II laser-guided bombs (left) hitting rebel armor (right) and coursed virally around the internet. Moreover, the rebels contend that they had informed NATO that (a) they had 400 tanks in their possession, and (b) they were moving some of the T55 and T72 tanks from Benghazi to Brega. On startling aspect of the incident was this comment by RADM Harding: “It is not for us, trying to protect civilians of whatever persuasion, to improve communications with those rebel forces.” *INSIDER* spoke to strategist, defense analyst and shipmate Steve Schippert of THREATS WATCH. If NATO wasn’t hiking communications with the rebels, we asked him, just who was? **Steve’s answer is below.**



ON MISURATA, A SLUG-FEST CONCEIVED IN STALINGRAD

More than 6 weeks ago, on 24 February 2011,¹⁰ we wrote:

Tactical Assessment: What’s being fought ... is the **Battle of Stalingrad** on a smaller scale. Forces have anchored their lines in buildings that provide a strategic view of streets and plazas. Apartments, warehouses and corner stores or residences are bunkers and high-value targets to be seized by the opposition. Every street is a front, every staircase a firefight.

A report filed today by the U.K.’s ITV NEWS describes Stalingrad-style, house-to-house street-fighting in Misurata. **Positions occupied by pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces haven’t changed for a month.**

ITV reports that most of the injured at the Misurata hospital are civilians, including children:

Street-by-street fighting which NATO forces are unable to prevent and culminates in the death of a young boy playing innocently in a garden.

¹⁰ “Flash: Libyan Cities Fall, Tripoli Besieged, U.S.-Chartered Ferry Frozen Pier-Side.” *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-032 24 February 2011.

ITV finds that among the revolutionary fighters are clothing store clerks who are now serving as snipers, 22-year-old engineer students manning RPGs and oncology surgeons who are now pulling duty as ER docs treating gun shot wounds. For a must-see, **LOOK FURTHER.**



In this sequence of un-marked photos published by a *Jihadi* site, the revolutionary in the striped shirt (upper left) armed with a machete has just been shot by a sniper and falls to the ground (upper right). Comrades come to his aid (lower left) and help him to a vehicle (lower right), but it is too late. The militant site did not specify the location of the shooting. (*Un-marked photo from a Jihadi site.*)

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: "THE WORLD USUALLY LOSES ITS WAY"

Seven weeks ago tomorrow, we shared with readers of our proprietary, near-daily intelligence summary a critique of "Responsibility to Protect" (RtoP), the principles intended to guide nations in mounting "humanitarian interventions"¹¹ in the hope of preventing another Srebrenica massacre.¹² We cited the work of Prof. Alan Kuperman, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, who writes that RtoP fails in practice for two reasons. First, the international community can rarely muster the political will *when* it is needed to protect people in danger (e.g., Darfur). Second, if it finds the will, the world usually loses its way (*emphasis added*):

The root of the problem is that [crimes against humanity] often represent state retaliation against a sub-state group for rebellion, or armed secession ... **Intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but it is usually too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians.** Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy ... It creates a moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but **it cannot fully protect these groups against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur.**

¹¹ "Background on RtoP: The Operative Principle in Washington and the U.N." *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-032 24 February 2011.

¹² In "What's Behind Door Number 2 in Libya?" we pictured a "resurgent Qaddafi with vengeance in his eyes" who "bursts forward to get even with the ... opposition in a wave of reprisals and violence that conjure up Bosnia of the 1990s." **That vengeance is what is feared in Misurata today.** Looking back, humanitarian and military experts of every stripe conclude that **Operation Deny Flight** (the Bosnian No-Fly) was too little, too late." The fear in Libya was a repeat of July 1995 when "Bosnian Serb soldiers overran the town of Srebrenica, a U.N.-protected zone, where they slaughtered some 8,000 Muslims, mostly boys and men. (*FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-032 24 February 2011). The next day, Vice President Joe Biden spoke of the same era and the same error in the same manner ("Assessment" under "An Aside: The 'Lion of the Desert' is Everywhere," *FORWARD-LEANING INSIDER* 11-034 25 February 2011).

Prof. Kuperman’s analysis resonates with the ITV report:

[Misurata] is a thorn in the colonel’s side, an embarrassment not far from his capital and his home town. He is trying to bleed it into submission, but the people here know that, despite the toll, surrender would mean slaughter for all of them.

Assessment: However well-intended, the No-Fly Zone established by UNSCR 1973, coupled with the resolution’s prohibition against “a foreign occupation force of any form,” will be judged as “too little, too late” – if not by history, then by the Qaddafi opposition in Misurata.



Above, a **Tornado GR4** prepares for take-off from its base at RAF MARHAM in March. Wing Commander Paul Godfrey said the Libya operation was the quickest ramp-up of his career: “It’s the fastest I’ve ever seen, [going] from ‘we-don’t-know-where-we’re-going’ to ‘right-we’re-going’ in 20 years.” The triple-rail launcher for **Brimstone** missiles is visible under the port intake. One casualty of the war over Libya is the U.K.’s **STRATEGIC DEFENCE & SECURITY REVIEW (SDSR)**. Based on “the assumption of conflict avoidance,” SDSR cut programs like the **Tornado GR4** and **Sentinel surveillance aircraft** whose pilots have their hands full *faci*ng conflict over Libya. **LOOK FURTHER.** (Photo courtesy of MoD.)

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TURN TIGHTER, GO FASTER, LOOK FURTHER™

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